Monday, 11 August 2014

Without Prejudice

BE-v-DE [2014] EWHC 2318 (Fam)

Bodey J summarises the law on without prejudice as follows:

THE LAW
  1. I have been provided with a lever arch file of 17 authorities. I have not however gleaned that there is any, or any significant, disagreement between counsel about the principles to be applied. I can therefore refer essentially to Phipson on Evidence 18th edition. The starting-point is that written or oral communications made in a genuine attempt to settle a dispute between the parties will not generally be admitted into evidence: Phipson paras.24-09 and 24-13. The policy is that parties should be encouraged to settle their disputes without resort to litigation and such that they can speak freely: Cutts v. Head [1984] Ch 290 at 306 per Oliver LJ. A first unsolicited letter offering settlement or negotiations marked 'without prejudice' will as a matter of policy therefore be protected; and so it is that the without prejudice principle is said to rest partly (a) on that public policy just mentioned and partly (b) on an express or implied agreement between the parties that they will not later rely in an open context on the contents of settlement negotiations. There has to be a bona fide attempt to resolve a dispute, in the absence of which the without prejudice principle is not engaged: Phipson 24-11. As Mr. Bishop QC says, the words "without prejudice" are not essential, although clearly persuasive. When they are not used, the occasion or document may still be found to be without prejudice "...if it is clear from the surrounding circumstances that the parties were seeking to compromise the action": Rush & Tompkins v. GLC [1989] 1 AC 1280 at 1299 per Lord Griffiths. At para.24-13(d) Phipson puts it in this way:

    "Even if the words 'without prejudice' were not used, the without prejudice principle will still apply if the circumstances, judged objectively, were such that it can be assumed to have been intended that the communications in question, being made with a view to settlement, be not admitted in evidence."

  2. There is a modest and, in my judgment, obiter suggestion in South Shropshire DC v. Amos [1986] 1 WLR 1271 at 1277 by Parker LJ that the applicable test might be subjective, i.e. that the subjective intent of the person making the proposal - here the husband – is critical as to whether the circumstances of an alleged negotiation showed it to be without prejudice. I read the relevant sentence in South Shropshire as being said in the context of the particular facts of that case. Further, in Pearson Education Ltd. v. Prentice Hall India Private Ltd. [2005] EWHC 636, Crane J declined to follow any such suggestion as may be read in South Shropshire, noting that it would be contrary to the tenets of contractual construction and would lead to the undesirable need for oral evidence and cross-examination on interlocutory applications (such as this one before me). He cited from a decision of Laddie J in Schering Corporation v. CIPLA Ltd. and Neolab Ltd. [2004] EWHC 2587 where Laddie J said at para.17 of his Judgment:

    "... Can the document be regarded as a negotiating document? If so, and if it is clear that it is intended by the author to be treated as without prejudice, it must be covered by the privilege."

    But he, Crane J, further noted that Laddie J had earlier said at para.14 of his judgment:

    "The court has to determine whether or not a communication is bona fide intended to be part of or to promote negotiations. To determine that, the court has to work out what, on a reasonable basis, the intention of the author was and how it would be understood by a reasonable recipient." [Emphasis added].

  3. Accordingly, in para.22 of his judgment in Pearson, Crane J said that in his view the test is an objective one. I respectfully agree. So too do the editors of Phipson, when they say that the question "... must surely be determined objectively": para.24-14. That is therefore the test which I propose to apply in determining this case. This hearing has in any event not been set up for any examination of the parties' respective subjective views of what was happening or intended to happen on 22nd April 2013 (ie according to the husband, a start of negotiations by way of his giving the wife 'the document', as his offer; and, according to the wife, a cynical ambush to bully and coerce her into conceding the country X property regime and giving up many of her rights). I therefore have to and shall determine the issue on the paper evidence of the parties, which will almost always be the appropriate approach in any event, if the proper test is an objective one.

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